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LIABILITY OF INSURER
Insurance-Liability of Insurer Beyond Policy Limits-
The Danger of Strict Liability
A, the owner of a 10,000 dollars liability insurance policy with com-
pany X, is sued by B. Pursuant to the insurance contract, the company
undertakes the defense of the lawsuit, controlling all aspects of the litiga-
tion including the right to settle. An offer to settle the case for the pol-
icy limits is made, which the insurer rejects. At the trial the jury awards
the plaintiff a verdict of 100,000 dollars. After company X pays its
10,000 dollars, the defendant A is liable for the remainder of the judg-
ment. A brings an action against the company for wrongful refusal to
settle within the policy limits.
This fact situation, presented to the California Supreme Court in
Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.,' confronts the parties to the insurance
contract with an inherent conflict of interests. Since under the terms of
the policy the insurer reserves the exclusive right to settle claims, an of-
fer by the plaintiff at or near the policy limits gives rise to conflicting
desires. "The insurer is interested in settling the claim at the lowest
amount within the policy limit, while the insured desires to avoid any
liability for the excess."' In affirming an award for the excess judgment
and for 25,000 dollars for the insured's mental suffering,' the California
court carefully considered the arguments for a strict liability rule in this
area.4 Simply stated, a strict liability rule would provide that "whenever
an insurer receives an offer to settle within the policy limits and rejects
it, the insurer should be liable in every case for the amount of any final
judgment whether or not within policy limits."5 After considering argu-
ments for this proposed rule, the court declined "to determine whether
there might be some countervailing considerations ...because ...the
evidence' is clearly sufficient to support the determination [under the
166 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
'Terrell v. Western Cas & Sur. Co., 427 S.W.2d 827-28 (Ky. 1968).
'The award of 25,000 dollars for mental suffering raises an interesting ques-
tion of whether damages for wrongful refusal to settle are to sound in contract
or tort. Discussion of this point, however, is not within the scope of this note.
See generally Note, Excess Recovery-Liability Insurer Who Refused Settlement
Within Policy Limits Held Liable for Excess Recovery and Mental Damages,
43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 199 (1968); Note, Refusal to Settle Claim Below Policy Limits
-Damages for Mental Suffering, 22 Sw. L.J. 374, 377-79 (1968).
'There were a large number of amicuts curiae briefs filed supporting the pro-
posed rule.
66 Cal. 2d at 430, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
'The evidence was that the insurer knew that there was a strong likelihood
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bad faith doctrine] ."7
The California court is apparently the first court to give a strong
indication that it might promulgate a strict liability rule in the excess
judgment context.' While all courts hold that an insurance carrier will
be liable for a wrongful refusal to settle under certain conditions," the
basic split heretofore has involved the question of whether the company
is liable for mere negligence0 in refusing to settle or solely for a bad
faith" refusal. The central issue under either standard concerns the
weight the carrier must give to the interests of the insured in determin-
ing not to settle. "The predominant majority rule is that the insurer must
accord the interest of the insured the same faithful consideration it gives
its own interests . *... , Although the tests will vary in terminology,
most writers agree that the distinction between the negligence and bad
faith standards is minimal,'" for the insurer, as a professional in insurance
litigation, is often held to a higher standard than the average practition-
er.'" Consequently, mere negligence by the average defender might con-
stitute bad faith by the skilled insurer.'5
of a large excess judgment. Its only hope of a favorable verdict was proof of the
injured party's prior mental history. "Security was putting blind faith in the
power of its psychiatrists to convince the jury when it knew that the accident
could have caused the psychosis. .. " Id. at 432, 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr.
at 18.
"Id. at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17 (footnote added). These
arguments will be discussed later in the note. See generally Comment, Liability
of Insurer for Judgment in Excess of Policy Limits, 48 MIcH. L. REV. 95
(1949); Comment, Crisci's Dicta of Strict Liability for Insurer's Failure to
Settle: A Move Toward Rational Settlement Behavior, 43 WAsH. L. REV. 799
(1968); Note, Excess Liability: Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Neg-
glience Ride, 18 STAN. L. REv. 475 (1966); Note, Liability Insurer's Duty to
Settle, 13 U. CHaI. L. REv. 105 (1945).
' Some courts have considered the doctrine and have rejected it. E.g., Kaudern
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp. 83 (D.N.J. 1967).
'See generally Brown v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 314 F.2d 675 (2d
Cir. 1963): 7A J. APPLE:MAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRActicE §§ 4712-13 (1962,
Supp. 1968) [hereinafter cited as APPLEMAN]; Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955);
Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L. Rrv.
1136 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Keeton]; Note, Inssurer's Liability for Refitsal to
Settle, 42 ST. JoHNs L. REV. 544 (1968).
" E.g., Smith v. Transit Cas. Co., 281 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Tex. 1968).
"E.g., Bowers v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 51 N.J. 62, 237 A.2d 857 (1968).
2 Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 389 Pa. 459, 470, 134 A.2d 223, 228
(1957).
" See 7A APPLEMAN § 4712; Annot., supra note 9; Keeton.
"State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marcum, 420 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Ky.
1967); accord, Bowers v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 51 N.J. 62, 237 A.2d 857
(1968).
" 7A APPLEMAN § 4712. Following this reasoning one court has stated that
"[T]he insurer is simply held to a standard of reasonable conduct and avoidance
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An analysis of case law reveals that under both the good faith and
negligence standards, no one factor is determinative of liability. A list-
ing of relevant considerations includes the following:
(1) the strength of the injured claimant's case on the issues of li-
ability and damages; (2) attempts by the insurer to induce the in-
sured to contribute to the settlement; (3) failure of the insurer to
properly investigate the circumstances involved in the accident, which
would result in its inability to effectively weigh the evidence against
the insured; (4) the insurer's rejection of advice of its own attorney
or agent; (5) failure of the insurer to inform the insured of the com-
promise offer; (6) the amount of financial risk to which each party
is exposed in the event of a refusal to settle; and (7) the fault of the
insured in inducing the insurer's rejection of the compromise offer
by misleading it as to the facts.'"
Although it has been held that the insurer has no duty to initiate settle-
ment negotiation,1 7 the fact that no offer was made within policy limits
is merely one factor to be considered in determining bad faith.'
8 "It has
been similarly established that an insurer's refusal to settle a case within
maximum policy limits . . . does not render the insurer liable per se to
its assured ..... " In view of the above considerations,2 ° perhaps the
insurer's best approach is to treat the settlement situation as though there
were no policy limits.'
North Carolina is in accord with the majority of states in holding the
insurer to a standard of good faith.2 Its statute provides: "The insur-
ance carrier shall have the right to settle any claim covered by the policy,
and if such settlement is made in good faith, the amount thereof shall be
deductible from the limits. ,, 2" Prior to the passage of this statute, the
of fraud, negligence, and/or bad faith. . . ." Powell v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co.,
88 Ill. App. 2d 343, 348, 232 N.E.2d 155, 158 (1967).
1 Kaudern v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp. 83, 88-89 (D.N.J. 1967), quoting
from Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
17 Oda v. Highway Ins. Co., 44 Ill. App. 2d 235, 194 N.E.2d 489 (1963).
18 State Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rowland, - Tenn. - , 427 S.W.2d 30 (1968);
accord, Cernocky v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America, 69 IIl. App. 2d 196, 216
N.E.2d 198 (1966).
10 Powell v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 88 Ill. App. 2d 343, 347-48, 232 N.E.2d
155, 158 (1967).
' The considerations mentioned are by no means intended to be an exhaustive
listing of all relevant factors. See generally 7A APPLEMAN §§ 4712-13; Keeton.
" Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967).
" Annot., supra note 9.
"1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (f) (3) (1953). See Bradford v. Kelly, 260
N.C. 382, 132 S.E.2d 886 (1963). Consider also the impact of the UNIFORM COM-
M1ERCIAL CODE which states that "the obligations of good faith, diligence, reason-
1969]
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North Carolina Supreme Court had consistently followed the good faith
test -24 since its passage, the court has continued to follow it,25 although
on one occasion it specifically refused to decide whether the insurer was
liable for negligence.26 The most recent case dealing with North Caro-
lina's standard is Abernathy v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co.27 In this
case the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a nonsuit in the dis-
trict court, and held that the mere refusal by the company to entertain
an offer of settlement before trial was sufficient to carry the case to the
jury on the issue of bad faith.28 The court pointed out that all cases have
at least a "nuisance" value and that the flat refusal to negotiate should
be considered by the jury. 9 The practical effect of this decision is to
give the insured a strong bargaining point in further negotiations with
the insurer, since it is common knowledge that juries favor those suing
insurance companies 20
In analyzing the case law, it becomes apparent that there are strong
arguments both for and against the trend"' towards a strict liability rule.
ableness and care prescribed by this chapter may not be disclaimed by agree-
ment. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-102(3) (1965).
2Wynnewood Lumber Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 173 N.C. 269, 91 S.E. 946
(1917); accord, State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1939).
"Henry v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 139 F. Supp. 806 (E.D.N.C. 1956); Bradford
v. Kelly, 260 N.C. 382, 132 S.E.2d 886 (1963); Alford v. Textile Ins. Co., 248 N.C.
224, 103 S.E.2d 8 (1958).
2 Alford v. Textile Ins. Co., 248 N.C. 224, 103 S.E.2d 8 (1958). The court
has stated, however, that the carrier, when wrongfully refusing to defend, is liable
only for a reasonable amount of the consent judgment in excess of limits. Nixon
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 255 N.C. 106, 120 S.E.2d 430 (1961).
27373 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1967).
2" This case is quite interesting on its facts. Insured held a policy with 30,000
dollars maximum limit. Insured's car ran into the rear of another car which
had previously hit a van in the rear. There were four fatalities and one serious
injury. The main issue was whether the second accident was the proximate cause
of any or all injuries sustained in the adverse party's car. Two wrongful death
actions were consolidated for trial and the jury returned a verdict for the insured
which was affirmed on appeal. Lawing v. Landis, 256 N.C. 677, 124 S.E.2d 877
(1962). The second suit was by the injured occupant, and the jury gave a 10,000
dollar verdict against the insured, which was also affirmed on appeal. Punch v.
Landis, 258 N.C. 114, 128 S.E.2d 224 (1962). This left 20,000 dollars in insurance
coverage. There was an offer to settle the last two wrongful death actions for
15,000 dollars. The company refused, and at the trial the injured passenger testi-
fied for the first time that he remembered all the occupants being alive after the
first wreck, a critical issue. The judge advised insured's attorney that he should
settle to which he replied that he did not have 50 dollars authority. 373 F.2d at
568.
29 373 F.2d at 569.
20 It should be pointed out that the case was eventually settled for a substantial
figure.
"'At least one federal judge interprets it as a new trend saying that "the
reasoning of the California Supreme Court seems to indicate a trend towards
requiring insurance companies to act more responsibly towards their customers
[Vol. 47
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The basic theme of the strict liability argument, as announced in Crisci,
is that the rule would "eliminate the danger that an insurer, faced with a
settlement offer at or near policy limits, will reject it and gamble with the
insured's money to further its own interests.""2 This argument is seem-
ingly answered, however, in the next sentence of the court's opinion where
it states that "it is not entirely clear that the proposed rule would place
a burden on insurers substantially greater than that which is present un-
der existing laws." 3 Surely the burden would not be substantially great-
er if the carrier were truly gambling with the insured's money, due to the
existing negligence and bad faith standards. But what of the notion that
"a mistake [of judgment], honestly made does not subject the person to
legal liability?" 4 Consider further the obvious change in the burden of
proof. Absent some affirmative defense such as fraud, an insured would
merely be required to prove the rejection of an offer that was within
policy limits. Proponents of a strict liability rule argue that it would be
simple to apply and would avoid determining whether the insurer's de-
cision was reasonable.35 This logic would obviate a function that juries
regularly perform in simple negligence cases. Perhaps the most attractive
argument of the proponents of strict liability is that "where insurer's and
insured's interest necessarily conflict, the insurer, which may reap the
benefit of its determination not to settle, should also suffer the detriments
of its decision '." 6 This argument apparently overlooks the fact that the
parties to the contract expressly bargained for limited, not absolute, liabil-
ity. Furthermore, the insurer is granted the right to control settlements.
37
Strict liability would make the insurer absolutely liable for the excess
though the company was exercising an express contractual right ;38 where-
with respect to offers of settlement." Kaudern v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp.
83, 89 n.5 (D.N.J. 1967).
- 66 Cal. 2d at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
"Id.
"Wynnewood Lumber Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 173 N.C. 269, 271, 91 S.E.
946, 947 (1917).
" See 66 Cal. 2d at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17 (dictum).
T Id.
"It must be remembered that the insured's cause of action is normally based
on the alleged breach of an implied covenant found in this settlement control clause.
See Annot., supra note 9; Keeton.
" While it is true that the insurance contract is not truly an arms length
transaction, the insured is normally protected by his state legislature, which con-
dones this clause. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (f) (3) (1953). As pointed
out by one writer, the full impact of the Crisci dicta is that it "holds out to liability
insureds the prospect that they will have the best of both worlds: absolute con-
tractual liability of the insurer, without necessity of proof other than rejection
of an offer within policy limits, plus liability for financial damage, mental suffer-
ing, and perhaps other items of damage." Levitt, The Crisci Case-Something
Old, Something New, 580 INs. L.J. 12, 18 (1968).
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as, the insured would be completely protected if the settlement offer had
been within policy limits.
An ancillary problem presented by the excess judgment cases is wheth-
er the injured party, either as a third party beneficiary or as an assignee
of the insured's rights, may sue the insurer. The great weight of au-
thority holds that the injured party is not a third party beneficiary and
may not sue for bad faith in a direct action,"8 although an exception has
been found in the case of compulsory insurance laws.4 ° The concept of
allowing the insured to assign his cause of action has received some
approval,4 for it allows the insured to effectuate a settlement of the ex-
cess that the company allegedly caused.42 A strong countervailing argu-
ment is that such assignments would breed collusion between the injured
person and the insured.43 It is not difficult to foresee settlement offers
being made within the policy limits solely to give rise to a bad faith ac-
tion, and this danger would be increased by a strict liability rule. Some
states effectively preclude such assignments by holding that the insured
must make payment on the excess judgment before he has a cause of
action against the insurer.44
Under present law the liability of the parties to the insurance con-
tract is often uncertain in the settlement situation. Perhaps the best
solution, suggested by at least one writer,46 is to include a provision in
the insurance policy to the effect that the liability of the insurer will be
double the original limits, should the insurer reject an offer that is within
those policy limits. Such a provision would not eliminate all excess
judgment actions. It would, however, tend to (1) minimize the risk that
"9 See, e.g., Browdy v. State-Wide Ins. Co., 56 Misc. 2d 610, 289 N.Y.S.2d
711 (Sup. Ct. 1968).' Id. While North Carolina has not passed upon this point, it should be noted
that the state does have compulsory liability insurance.
"E.g., Terrell v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 427 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1968).
Contra, Dillingham v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 592, 381 S.W.2d 914 (1964).
See Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 1158 (1967).
" Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 1158 (1967).
"Id.
"Universal Auto. Ins. Co. v. Culberson, 126 Tex. 282, 86 S.W.2d 727 (1935).
Contra, United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Evans, 116 Ga. App. 93, 156 S.E2d
809 (1967). Any effect of this rule on the insured's cause of action has been
avoided by means of a declaratory judgment, but the holding still precludes an
assignment since the insured must still make some payment before he can sue the
insurer. Smith v. Transit Cas. Co., 281 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Tex. 1968).
" For an article making recommendations to insurers on how to avoid this
situation, see Snyder, Defense in Excess of Policy Limit Litigation, 18 FED. or
INS. COUNSELORS 9 (1968); see also O'Brien, Liability Beyond the Policy Limit,
391 INs. L.J. 525 (1955).
6 Keeton 1183-85; see Georgia L. Ins. Co. v. Mississippi C.R. Co., 116 Miss.
114, 76 So. 646 (1917) (policy provided double coverage).
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DUTY OF INNOCENT PURCHASER
the insurer will gamble with the insured's money, since rejection of an
offer within policy limits will expose the carrier to double liability, and
(2) would determine the outer limits of the insurer's liability, absent
actual bad faith. Such a provision would be more reasonable than court
imposition of strict liability, which would frequently impose liability for
exercising a contractual right, often one approved by the state legisla-
ture." Before such drastic action is taken, the legislature should give
its express sanction.
JAMES R. CARPENrER, JR.
Labor Law-Innocent Purchaser's Duty to Reinstate Employees
The NLRB, under Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, has authority to issue a remedial order against an employer who
"has engaged in or is engaging in .. . unfair labor practice[s]."I The
exercise of this authority is unquestioned when the order is directed
against the guilty employer. If the guilty employer sells his business
before the unfair practice has been remedied, however, the Board must
decide whether the order may be directed against the purchaser. If the
purchaser is but a "disguised continuance" of the seller' or one who has
concerted with the guilty employer to evade the order,' the Board may
properly direct an order against the purchaser. When the purchase is
made in good faith, the problems are more acute. An examination of the
decisions reveals the Board's difficulties.
Initially, the Board recognized no limitation as to the parties who
could be bound by an order under Section 10(c) once an unfair labor
practice was discovered. In the 1948 decision of Alexander Milburn Co.,4
a purchaser, who was neither a "disguised continuance" nor an "evader,"
"I E.g., N.C. GEr. STAT. § 20-279.21 (f) (3) (1953).
1 National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
If... the Board shall be of the opinion that any person . .. has engaged
in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board ... shall
issue ...an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such
unfair practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement
of employees with or without back pay as will effectuate the policies of this
Act.
rd.
, Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945); Southport Petro. Co. v.
NLRB, 315 U.S. 100 (1942).
' Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945); NLRB v. Ozark Hard-
wood Co., 282 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1960).
'78 N.L.R.B. 747 (1948).
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